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COMMENTS
ready for trial. It was held that such announcement in effect constituted
a plea. However, in Miller v. People,41 where the accused voluntarily
proceeded with the trial without being arraigned or entering a plea the
court held that the conviction was a nullity. In spite of the similarity to
the Spicer case, the court ignored the state's argument that the voluntary
proceeding with the trial was tantamount to a plea.
The law in regard to arraignment has changed gradually. The reasons
for the strictness of the common law in this area have disappeared. Sub-
stantive personal rights, once unknown, have been made available to those
accused of crimes. Certainly criminal proceedings should not be affected
by reason of technical errors in procedure which have not substantially
prejudiced those basic rights of the accused afforded by present-day law.
Such would be inconsistent with due administration of justice and fatal
to efficient enforcement of the criminal code.
LESSOR'S LIABILITY UNDER DRAM SHOP ACT
The Illinois Dram Shop Act is a statute which, under certain conditions,
imposes joint and several liability upon the tavern keeper and lessor of
land used for the sale of intoxicating liquor. The Act is not a new one,
having been enacted originally by the Illinois legislature in the nineteenth
century. This comment is concerned with the lessor's, or land owner's,
liability under the Act.
At common law, there was no remedy for injuries incident to in-
toxication resulting from the sale of liquor, either on the theory that
there was a direct wrong or on the ground that there was negligence in
the sale.' The Illinois legislature created a right of action by enacting
the Dram Shop Act, or Civil Damage Act, as it is sometimes known. This
Act gives a right of action for injuries resulting from the sale of intoxicat-
ing liquor against the owner of premises who knowingly permits the use
of his property for such sale, and subjects the premises so used to a lien
for the payment of a judgment recovered against the lessee-tavern
keeper.
2
4147 11. App. 472 (1893).
' Schroder v. Crawford, 94 IM. 357 (1880).
2111. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 43, S 135. "Every husband, wife, child, parent, guardian,
employer, or other person, who shall be injured, in person or property, or means of
support, by any intoxicated person, or in consequence of the intoxication, habitual
or otherwise, of any person, shall have a right of action in his or her own name,
severally or jointly, against any person or persons who shall, by selling or giving
alcoholic liquor, have caused the intoxication, in whole or in part, of such person;
and any person owning, renting, leasing, or permitting the occupation of any building
or premises, and having knowledge that alcoholic liquors are to be sold therein, or
who having leased the same for other purposes, shall knowingly permit therein the
sale of any alcoholic liquors that have caused, in whole or in part, the intoxication
of any person, shall be liable, severally or jointly, with the person or persons selling
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The design of the legislature in passing the Dram Shop Act was to
"mitigate the evils of the traffic or to compensate for the damage done by
it."3 In reviewing the decisions, it is found that the courts keep upper-
most in mind the purpose of the statute: to suppress the liquor traffic and
to protect the innocent persons injured thereby.
Although the lessor does not sell the intoxicating liquor, he is deemed
to have subjected himself to the risk of liability to persons injured by the
traffic, if he knowingly rents or permits his premises to be used for such
purpose.'
Under the Illinois Act, ownership of premises alone does not impose
liability on the lessor for damages resulting from the sale of intoxicating
liquor. It must also be shown that the lessor had knowledge that intoxicat-
ing liquor was to be sold or was sold on his premises.5 However, such
knowledge of the lessor may be established by facts and circumstances
and direct proof is not necessary.6 The fact that a tavern keeper had
been operating a tavern on the premises for several years is a circumstance
from which the jury could reasonably infer that the owner had knowl-
edge that the premises were being used for the sale of intoxicating
liquor.7
Generally, the liability of the lessor depends first on the establishment
of the liability of the lessee.8 Where this is established, the Act gives
the plaintiff three distinct remedies: (1) to sue the tavern keeper alone;
(2) to sue the lessor alone; or (3) to sue the lessor and the tavern keeper
jointly."
Further, the Illinois Dram Shop Act provides for a twofold liability
against the lessor for a person injured as a result of the sale of intoxicating
liquor. First, it imposes a personal responsibility on the lessor who know-
ingly rents or permits his premises to be used for such sale and, secondly,
it subjects the lessor's premises to a lien for the payment of a judgment
recovered against the lessee.' 0
or giving liquors aforesaid, as hereinafter provided; ... recovery under this Act for
injury to the person or... for loss of means of support resulting from the death or
injury of any person, as aforesaid, shall not exceed $15,000; provided that every action
hereunder shall be commenced within two years next after the cause of action
accrued."
8 Gibbons v. Cannaven, 393 Ill. 376, 387, 66 N.E. 2d 370, 375 (1946).
4Wall v. Allen, 244 Ill. 456, 91 N.E. 678 (1910).
I Eggers v. Hardwick, 155 Ill. App. 254 (1910).
6 Ibid.
7lHorrigths v. Troesch, 201 Ill. App. 433 (1916).
s Gibbons v. Cannaven, 393 Ill. 376, 66 N.E. 2d 370 (1946).
9 I11. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 43, S 135.
10 11. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 43, S 136. "For the payment of any judgment for damages
and costs that may be recovered against any person in consequence of the sale of
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This section of the Illinois Dram Shop Act, enabling the plaintiff,
on the strength of his judgment against the lessee, to perfect a lien on the
property in which the liquor was sold, has been held by the United States
Supreme Court to be a proper exercise of the police power of the state,
and not in violation of the due process clause of the federal or state
constitution." In discussing the statute, the Supreme Court stated that
the Act has the effect of making:
... the tenant the agent of the landlord for its purposes, and through this
agency, voluntarily assumed, the landlord becomes a participant in the sale of
intoxicants and is responsible for the consequences resulting from them.' 2
It was further held in Gibbons v. Cannaven,13 that the lessor had no
right to notice of the action against the occupant nor any right or op-
portunity to appear or defend therein nor to appeal from such judgment.
In overruling the contention of the lessor that this interpretation was
in violation of the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions,
the court said:
. ..The [lessor] overlooks the fact that traffic in intoxicating liquors is only a
legitimate business within the conditions prescribed by the legislature in per-
mitting their sale. In the exercise of the police power, the legislature may enact
laws for the purpose of protecting the health, morals and safety of the people,
either by prohibiting traffic in intoxicating liquors or licensing it or permitting
it under any conditions which, in their judgment, they may approve. 14
In holding that the property owner in the Gibbons case did not have
an interest sufficient to permit him to appeal where a judgment was ren-
dered against the lessee alone, the lessor not being joined, the court de-
parted from the line of decisions which have held that a party not of
record can maintain an appeal if he can show a direct interest in the judg-
ment, or that he would benefit by reversal. 15 It has been said that:
alcoholic liquor under the preceding section, the real estate and personal property
of such person, of every kind, except such as may be exempt from levy and sale upon
judgment and execution, shall be liable; and such judgment shall be a lien upon such
real estate until paid; and in case any person shall rent or lease to another any building
or premises to be used or occupied, in whole or in part, for the sale of alcoholic
liquors, or shall knowingly permit the same to be used or occupied, such building
or premises so used or occupied shall be held liable for and may be sold to pay any
such judgment against any person occupying such building or premises.'
"1 Gibbons v. Cannaven, 393 Ill. 375, 66 N.E. 2d 370 (1946); Flaherty v. Murphy,
291 Ill. 595, 126 N.E. 553 (1920); Eiger v. Garrity, 246 U.S. 97 (1918); Wall v. Allen,
244 Ill. 456, 91 N.E. 678 (1910).
12Eiger v. Garrity, 246 U.S. 97, 103 (1918).
18 393 111. 376, 66 N.E. 2d 370 (1946).
14 Ibid., at 383 and 373.
15 Hotchkiss v. Calumet City, 377 111. 615, 37 N.E. 2d 332 (1941); Lenhart v. Miller,
375 IMl. 346, 31 N.E. 2d 781 (1940).
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It is difficult to call the property owner's interest anything less than direct
when it is so probable that the plaintiff will be forced to collect the judgment
from the property owners because of the inability of tavern keepers as a class
to meet such judgments.' 6
What the court is actually holding, however, in prohibiting the property
owners from making an appeal, is that the Dram Shop Act gives the plain-
tiff three distinct remedies, one of which is to sue the tavern keeper alone.
Thus, to allow the property owner to appeal a judgment obtained against
the tavern keeper alone, would deprive the plaintiff of one of the remedies
which the legislature has given the plaintiff-the right to sue the tavern
keeper alone. The property owner cannot intervene in the original action
against the tavern keeper; he cannot appeal a decision against the tavern
keeper; and, if he is sued on the judgment against the tavern keeper, he
cannot question the merits of the judgment. It would seem that basic
notions of justice would require that a party who might be compelled
to pay a judgment should have an opportunity to defend in the original
action.
The property owner, however, is not entirely defenseless, for it has been
held that, in the subsequent action on the original judgment against the
tavern keeper, the lessor may deny: (1) the existence of the judgment or
that any part remains unpaid; (2) that a lease was made for the use of the
premises as a tavern; or (3) that the property was so used with his knowl-
edge, if a lease was not made for the use of the premises as a tavern.
17
The most frequently disputed issues of fact are settled in the original
action; i.e., whether the injury was caused by a person who became intoxi-
cated in the tavern on the property owner's premises; the extent of the
plaintiff's injuries; the existence of acts by the plaintiff contributing to the
intoxication of the tortfeasor;'8 and the existence of a provocation of
assault, if any.') Consequently, the lessor's liability is ordinarily settled in
the original judgment against the tavern keeper.
20
In addition, although it has been said that the Dram Shop Act is penal in
character and should be strictly construed, the courts in recent years have
given this rule of strict construction mere lip service.
21
16 14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 80, 82 (1946), noting Gibbons v. Cannaven, 393 Ill. 376,
66 N.E. 2d 370 (1946).
17 Eiger v. Garrity, 246 U.S. 97 (1918).
18 Bowman v. O'Brien, 303 II1. App. 630, 25 N.E. 2d 544 (1940).
19 Hill v. Alexander, 321 Ill. App. 406, 53 N.E. 2d 307 (1944); Pearson v. Renfro,
320 111. App. 202, 50 N.E. 2d 598 (1943).
20 Garrity v. Eiger, 272 Ill. 127, 111 N.E. 735 (1916).
21 Howlett v. Doglio, 402 Ill. 311, 83 N.E. 2d 708 (1942); Lester v. Bugni, 316 III.
App. 19, 44 N.E. 2d 68 (1942); Osborn v. Leuffgen, 302 111. App. 206, 23 N.E. 2d 757
(1939); Hyba v. C. H. Horneman, Inc., 302 IIl. App. 143, 23 N.E. 2d 564 (1939).
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The courts, however, have placed some limitations on the lessor's liabil-
ity. In Blackwell v. Fernandez,22 it was held that an owner is not respon-
sible for the death of a person caused by the act of one who had become
intoxicated on liquor purchased by his roommate, when he had shared it
with such roommate in his own room and not in the place where pur-
chased. The court in reaching this conclusion quoted from Cruse v.
Aden:
23
... the Dram Shop Act does not apply to persons who are not either direct-
ly or indirectly . .. engaged in the liquor traffic, and that the right of action
given by said section ... is not intended to be given against a person who, in
his own house, or elsewhere, gives a glass of intoxicating liquor to a friend as a
mere act of courtesy and politeness, and without any purpose or expectation of
pecuniary gain or profit.
2 4
Also, although the statute expressly imposes liability upon any person
owning, renting, leasing, or permitting the occupation of his premises for
the sale of intoxicating liquors, the statute was held not to apply to a per-
son owning realty as a successor trustee in his representative capacity.25
And the statute was held not to apply to a person having only a rever-
sionary and contingent interest,2 0 and to a mortgagee, 27 since such persons
have not control over and are not responsible for the letting of the proper-
ty. However, the court refused to hold a person who, though not owning
the premises, had full control and management of the property with a
right to rent and select tenants, as if the owner of the premises, and who
executed a lease of the property as a tavern in his own name as lessor,
describing himself as the agent of the lessor.28 Also, it has been held that
a lien of judgment obtained under the Dram Shop Act does not take
priority over a mortgage on the premises executed and recorded before the
rendition of the judgment creating the lien.
29
What may seem a surprising result was reached in Gunderson v. First
National Bank, 0 where it was held that the landlord was not liable for in-
juries resulting from an assault inflicted by the lessee, who was intoxicated
on his own liquor, since there was no selling or giving of liquor to the
tavern operator within the meaning of the Act. However, a lessor was
22 324 IMl. App. 597, 59 N.E. 2d 342 (1945).
23 127 Ill. 231, 20 N.E. 73, at 77 (1889).
24 Ibid., at 239 and 77.
25 O'Connor v. Rathie, 298 Ill. App. 489, 19 N.E. 2d 96 (1939).
26 Castle v. Fogerty, 19 111. App. 442 (1886).
27 Bell v. Cassem, 158 111. 45, 41 N.E. 1089 (1895).
28 Osbom v. Leuffgen, 302 IMl. App. 206, 23 N.E. 2d 757 (1939).
2 9 Bell v. Cassem, 158 111. 45, 41 N.E. 1089 (1895).
30296 Ill. App. 111, 16 N.E. 2d 306 (1938).
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held liable where the lessee, who was not intoxicated, struck and injured
the plaintiff, who, being intoxicated on the liquor sold to him by the
tenant, provoked the assault.
8 1
The court's decision in the Gibbon's case, that the lessor cannot inter-
vene and become a party in the action against the tavern keeper nor appeal
from the judgment against the tavern keeper, emphasizes vividly the prob-
lem which the lessor faces in defending against an action based on the act.
Thus, most lessors, realizing the danger involved when leasing to a tavern
keeper, usually require the tavern keeper to carry liability insurance pro-
tecting both the tavern keeper and lessor jointly.
It is submitted that it might be highly practicable and certainly more
equitable to all parties concerned if there were a requirement that the
lessor be joined in the original action against the lessee. The Iowa Supreme
Court, in construing the Iowa Dram Shop Act amplified this view in Buck-
ham v. Grape.3 2 The court, on rehearing, said:
... The property owner could have been made a party to the original action,
and the rule requiring him to be joined therein in order to bind him by the
judgment would, in all cases, operate so as to secure the ends of justice, and in
no case work hardship. Before his property can be reached under the statute,
an issue must be joined and tried involving his knowledge of the sales of intoxi-
cating liquor upon his property. These issues may be tried in the original case.
Why not determine all the issues which the property owner may raise, in an
action against the vendor... ? If he be made a party to the action, he would be
bound by the judgment, and, without further proceedings, it could be declared
a lien upon his property. By this practice justice could be done to all parties,
and they would be relieved of litigating two cases, when all their rights could
be and ought to be settled in one .... 33
3l Thompson v. Wogan, 309 Ill. App. 413, 33 N.E. 2d 151 (1941).
32 65 Iowa 535, 22 N.W. 664 (1885).
88 Ibid., at 539-540 and 665.
